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Abstract
This paper proposes a new form of data
communication that is similar to slang in human
language. Using the context of the conversation
instead of an encryption key, nodes in a network
develop a unique alternative language to disguise the
real meaning of the communication between them.
Implementation of such a system, and its potential
benefits and challenges are discussed.

1. Introduction
For all practical purposes, modern cryptography
can be described as mathematics-based. In contrast this
paper proposes a language-based cryptography and
discusses how language-based cryptography might be
implemented, reasons why it might be advantageous,
and some challenges to practical implementation.
After a brief background review, the proposed idea
will be described, followed by some notes about
practical implementation. Some benefits, challenges,
and potential future uses and enhancements also will
be presented.

2. Background
Recently newspaper and trade press articles have
appeared with great frequency and quantity implying
to the general public that current security policies and
encryption methods may be insufficient to protect data
communication. The need to disguise communication,
particularly in this digital age, is well established and
well documented.
While math-based encryption generally has
proven successful in widespread application, at least
three eventualities credibly challenge that success.
First, traditional threats, such as brute force and replay
attacks, are not guaranteed to fail. Indeed, in the case
of brute force attacks, they are guaranteed eventually
to succeed. The probability of their success in the short
term is low, but it is greater than zero, and over time
increases to 1. The answer to this threat has been to use
larger encryption keys. Also, as computing speed has
increased in accordance with Moore’s Law; and
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because our preferred response seems to have been to
use essentially the same technology only with larger
numbers, we now are in a kind of arms race, hoping
ever-larger encryption keys will withstand ever-faster
computing power. Is this strategy sustainable? [1]
Second, in all keyed systems the secret is secure
only so long as the key is secure. Therefore, even the
strongest keyed encryption might be vulnerable to an
unsophisticated phishing attack, for example.
Third, quantum computing, once considered to
be beyond the horizon, now appears to be
forthcoming [2]. Machines that can do all the steps of
a complex calculation at once have the potential to
render our current math-based encryption schemes
obsolete.

2.1. Evolution of Modern Encryption
The Oxford dictionary defines encryption as “the
process of converting information or data into a code,
especially to prevent unauthorized access.” [22] In this
paper we more specifically define encryption as the
reversible algorithmic process of scrambling cleartext into an unreadable stream. One of the early
documented uses of encryption is the Caesar cipher,
named after the Roman general Julius Caesar who was
documented to use this method to communicate with
his subordinates. A Caesar cipher is a type of
substitution of characters with a shift of letters in a
known position [3]. An example of this would be to
shift each letter +3 positions in the alphabet so any
letters “A” in the original message would become the
letter “D” in the encoded version. This is among the
oldest known and documented forms of encryption
[3].
As communication methods between humans
evolved so have the means of encryption. Electronic
communication began in the form of the telegraph.
Wires were overtaken by radio waves and soon
anybody with a quartz crystal could receive broadcast
communications. Encryption was needed, especially
during wartime, to keep secrets from being directly
overheard by the enemy. Perhaps the most famous of
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wartime encryption was the Germans’ Enigma
machine used in World War II [4]. This machine used
a changing number of rotors that could be set to
transpose the alpha characters. Each machine was
capable of 17,576 combinations. This machine
provided the supposed secure communication that the
Axis powers needed to coordinate their methods.
However, thanks to Alan Turing and associates, the
Allied powers were able to break this code and thereby
gain knowledge of the Axis powers’ communications.
Another famous wartime example is the Navajo code
talkers of World War II. [24]
The Data Encryption Standard or DES is a 56-bit
encryption standard developed by IBM in 1977 [5] at
the behest of the National Bureau of Standards and was
used primarily by the United States Government
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. As computers
became more powerful and able to conduct
exponentially greater numbers of operations per
second, DES was relegated to obsolete status because
it was too easily and quickly broken. By 2000, the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) had supplanted
DES as the de facto standard of encryption [6].
As data communication evolved from wired to
wireless, encryption again was needed to help keep this
process safe from eavesdropping. The 802.11 standard
included encryption [7]. This encryption protocol
called Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) was a method
of scrambling the communication using a 40-bit key.
As Arbaugh et al [7] pointed out, this method was
quickly defeated and new, stronger standards were
needed.
One fundamental difficulty of these and other
“symmetric” encryption methods is the needed secrecy
of the key. Somehow, both sides of the communication
need to have possession of the key while keeping it
secret from all other parties.
“Asymmetric” or “public private key encryption” has
become the de facto solution for most modern
encryption schemes. Public key or asymmetric key
encryption was in development in the UK as early as
1973 but finally declassified in 1997 [8]. Asymmetric
encryption uses two keys: a publicly available one to
encrypt and a different, privately held one to decrypt.
New security measures, based on biometric tokens
and other non-mathematical substitution schemes are
now coming into practice. An example pertinent to this
paper is the “Captcha” program, which takes
advantage of something humans can do well, but
computers do poorly – recognize characters in a
distorted picture. This paper proposes a new process
that we call Lingual Transformation-based encryption,
or simply Lingual Transformation, which would apply

a similar concept, protecting data via schemes at which
computers are not inherently proficient. It would
disguise communication by evolving the language
used.

2.2. Human language evolves over time
Even without computers, humans often disguise
their communication by introducing changes to their
language, as in slang. Also, languages evolve over
time. Generally, the changes that occur include
spelling and pronunciation, the meaning of words
and/or phrases, and additions/deletions in the lexicon.
[9] Examples of evolutionary spelling changes can be
seen in American versus British spellings of words like
color (colour), and catalog (catalogue). Pronunciation
differences can be observed between one time and
another, as well as in regional differences. For
example, the word “leisure” may rhyme with
“treasure” or with “seizure”, often depending on the
age of the person saying it. Lexical changes occur as
new words come into widespread use (megabyte,
snowboard, google) and old words fall into disuse
(deliciate, aerodrome).
Another way in which language changes is by
development of slang. The difference in slang is that it
often assigns different meanings to existing words.
Although slang may have been used much earlier,
“What we mean by English slang today didn’t really
start until the 16th or 17th century in England. It
developed out of what was then called the ‘thieves
cant’, or the jargon developed by criminals. It’s
estimated that perhaps only 10,000 people out of the 4
million English speakers spoke the Thieves Cant, and
its purpose originally was the same as all jargon – to
be able to speak to each other without others knowing
what they were saying” [10].
In modern slang the meanings assigned to slang
words often depend on the context in which they are
spoken. In reference to a desired drink on a summer
day, the word “cool” has a completely different
meaning than when used in reference to a person who
remains calm under stress. Therefore, given a specific
context, the words and phrases employed in a
conversation may be understood differently, according
to that context. Thus, “Skier slang is different from
surfer slang, which is different from any other
subgroups’ slang, and the only way to know it, is to be
a part of that group” [11].

2.3. The Problem
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One major problem with modern cryptography is
that keyed encryption remains vulnerable to different
kinds of traditional attacks. Much of the threat against
encrypted communication can be classified into three
types [12]:
1. Man in the middle
2. Brute force
3. Replay attack
A man in the middle attack has the communication
routed through a computer that is controlled by the
attacker. The attacker copies the entire communication
and then, based upon the captured key, may pretend to
be the person at either end of the communication. This
allows the attacker to access or change the data. This
attack can be difficult to detect because after the
attacker obtains the desired data, the message can be
forwarded to the intended recipient, who presumably
will have no clue the communication was intercepted.
A brute force attack is when the attacker makes an
unending attempt to guess the password or key needed
to pretend to be the user. Given enough time and
unlimited attempts, brute force will always be
successful against math-based cryptography.
A replay attack is when the attacker listens and
records the communication stream. They then take this
recorded stream and replay one side of it against the
other side. This can lead to the attacked system
replying with the missing key. This attack also may be
difficult to detect because all aspects of the
communication are copied from the original source,
and therefore appear to be legitimate.
In addition to these known attack vectors, another
and ultimately more likely possibility is discovering
the files or databases where secret keys are kept [12].
By password cracking or other means, the attacker
obtains access to the files containing encryption keys
and then has the ability to compromise security for all
communication which relies on any of those keys.
Further, theoretically random key generation in real
implementation often is pseudo-random, which means
potentially predictable [13].
In recent history, a persistent challenge in
mathbased encryption is represented by a corollary to
Moore’s Law, which states that computing power (or
calculations per unit of time) will double every 18
months or so. This presents a problem to
mathematically “unsolvable” decryption equations. As
numbers of transistors in computer chips increase the
time required to solve these mathematical equations
decreases. Solving the equation is brute forcing the
decryption of the data. Additionally, there are timesaving factors such as rainbow tables to pre-generate

solutions to the mathematical equations to inject into
encrypted data tables [14]. Such methods can
exponentially speed illicit access to encrypted data
streams. In this vein, the apparently imminent advent
of quantum computers [15] may pose a serious threat
to all math-based encryption.
Much current encryption depends on a key and
proper key exchange facilitated by public key
verification
authorities
[16].
Unfortunately,
consolidated key verification also constitutes a single
point of failure. If a user’s private key is decoded or
stolen, any entity can claim to be that key holder. In
the case of a key verification authority being
compromised, the attacker then has access to all the
root certificates. An example of this is the DigiNotar
hack of 2011 [17].
A question arises then, about whether keyed,
math-based encryption really is the best we can do?
Perhaps humans’ intelligent manipulation of language
might serve as a different model for secure data
communication. The following section explores ideas
about mimicking human slang in data communication.

3. Theoretical Propositions
Slang consists, essentially, of substituting a
“wrong” word in place of a right word, while
conveying the right meaning. Drawing upon context,
speakers and listeners can infer the right meaning in
spite of saying or hearing the wrong word. Consider
the following short conversation:
Q: How did you like the movie? A:
Oh, it was good.
The answer, “it was good” would be understood
by anyone steeped in American culture if the
respondent had used any of the following words
instead of “good”. Note that none of the words’
original meaning corresponds to “good”.
Swell
Hot
Cool
Radical

Hip
Bad
Groovy
Sick

Although at times slang has been considered
vulgar and low, historically it seems to have been
widely known and used [19]. With the goal of instilling
the ability to create and use slang into computers, one
might first attempt to model the way humans create
and use slang. Extrapolating from the conversation
above, a basic model would depict two participants, A
and B, exchanging words via a communication
medium (Figure 1).
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Axiom 1: Humans, communicating within a
specific context, can create and use slang words and/or
phrases to convey meaning in a way that is, at least
temporarily, unintelligible to others who are not
participants in that context.
Figure 1.
Such a simplistic model clearly fails to capture the
purpose of communication. A better model is shown in
Figure 2.

Figure 2.
In Figure 2, A and B exchange meaning. Words
constitute the medium by which they do so (“words”
in this context are defined loosely to include any
representation of meaning, whether by a string of
characters or other representation.) Thus, A and B may
choose from among many words in their respective
vocabularies to convey a particular meaning (each
arrow represents a possible word choice; the longer
arrows represent the chosen words in Figure 3).

Figure 3.
In the models presented so far, the presence of a
third entity, C, must be assumed as an illicit
eavesdropper. As long as A and B use standard,
accepted vocabulary to convey their meaning, C will
have no problem understanding the same meaning.
Under the model in Figure 3, slang can be defined
simply as A and B agreeing on a new pathway (word)
to convey a specific meaning, particularly if agreement
can be reached without C’s participation. The only way
A and B can reach such agreement is by reference to
some context of which A and B are, but C is not, a part.
Because use of slang is both a part of
everyday language and a fact of history, arriving at the
following is easy:

The slang words may be new creations, invented
specifically to convey meaning (e.g., “nerd”), or they
may be existing words that are assigned new meaning
(e.g., “swell”). In either case, no additional effort is
required to disguise the communication – it can be
spoken aloud in mixed company. Further, no
restrictions exist on which words or phrases may be
chosen, as long as A and B can agree on the assigned
meaning. Thus, for example, even the word “bad” can
be used as a term to express something desirable.
While the models depicted in Figures 1-3 apply to
human communication, they may also apply to
computer communication. Viewing computer
communication as an extension of human
communication, logically:
Proposition 1: Like humans, computing machines
could achieve the same benefits communicating by
slang created from their own context.
Over time, however, the secretive purpose can be
frustrated as slang words come into more widespread
use and eventually are accepted into common
language. The remedy, of course, is to update the slang
lexicon frequently, thus staying ahead of eager but
uninitiated would-be users. Thus:
Axiom 2: Because slang is not guaranteed to
remain arcane for long, human slang continuously
evolves to meet the requirements of the users.
Computers mimicking human slang use would
face a similar challenge that any message “encrypted”
by slang would soon be discovered as the slang words’
meaning would eventually become known. Therefore,
the vocabulary used by communicating machines
similarly must evolve. In human communication,
language evolution takes time, and although evolution
occurs, sometimes the meaning can still be understood
as if the language had not changed. For example,
Shakespearean language is still intelligible today
despite obvious differences from modern English.
In contrast, however, slang may evolve for
expressly clandestine purposes. One requirement for
successfully achieving such purposes is changing fast
enough to keep ahead of unwanted users who try to
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decipher the evolving slang. Of course, speed is one of
the great strengths of modern computers. Therefore:
Proposition 2: Computers can “compress” the time
required for slang to evolve, thus rapidly and
continuously changing their shared slang and
consequently keeping outsiders – even fast ones – out.
The value humans derive from creating and using
slang lies in the ability to authenticate speakers as
members of an exclusive group and/or to maintain a
level of secrecy conversing with group members while
in the presence of non-members. The goals of modern
keyed encryption are almost identical. If computers
can create their own slang, and if they can do it quickly
enough to keep eavesdroppers flummoxed, then
Proposition 3: Computer-generated slang can meet the
same goals as modern encryption techniques.
Of course, proving or disproving theoretical
propositions such as these would be more than a simple
matter of practical implementation. Extensive testing
and real-world experience over time would also be
necessary. However, the process must begin
somewhere. The following section describes one way
it might be accomplished.

4. Implementation
As described above, language evolves over time in
several ways. Natural evolution seems to occur along
at least three dimensions [18]: the meaning of words,
spelling and pronunciation, and additions and deletions
in the lexicon. Purposely manipulating language to
render it arcane could be done in the same three ways
and also in other ways. Word substitutions, based on
any number of schemes from rhyming, to homonyms,
to synonyms; spelling variations, based on phoneme
disassembly/reassembly; and rearrangement of
grammar are a few possibilities among a potentially
very wide range of schemes [18]. Indeed, the
substitutions need not follow any externally
discernible method at all, as long as the
communicating parties can agree on them. Choosing
and combining such schemes in an unpredictable mix
would create a unique “slang” that could only be
understood by the entities that participated in making
it.
One crucial element for development of slang
among groups of humans is context. In order to create
a type of slang that could be used between two data

communication devices, some type of common context
must be established. The context must be unique and
exclusive such that only the entities involved in the
conversation are privy to the context. This makes an
interesting challenge because of the necessary
assumption that an eavesdropper is always listening.
Some manipulations that could be employed to
“evolve” a usable slang might include the same types
of methods employed by humans in creating slang, like
simply substituting context elements, or rhyming
words,
synonyms,
purposeful
misspellings,
homonyms, or disassembling/reassembling phonemes.
Of course, additional methods beyond those modeled
by generations of humans, would be limited only by
our ability to imagine and implement them. The
evolvable context of a flow of data between two
devices could include any protocol-related exchanges,
packet history, and/or some agreed-upon and mutually
external elements.

4.1. The All-Important Context
The common context is the critical component of the
system for several reasons. First, drawing from a
common context eliminates the need to exchange an
encryption key. The context gives the communicating
nodes a common “pool” from which they can draw
inferences about the intended meaning of “wrong”
words sent and received to convey “right” meaning.
This is important, for example, because traditional
stream ciphers suffer from a potentially debilitating
weakness: the key (called the seed) from which their
keystream originates, supposed to be entirely random,
in practice is often generated from internal computer
states that are pseudorandom, i.e., potentially
predictable. If a seed can be identified by an adversary,
the adversary can decrypt any encrypted messages
resulting from that seed [13]. An example of this
problem is the untimely obsolescence of WEP
encryption in early Wi-Fi implementations [21].
Drawing on a unique, common context eliminates the
need for an encryption key.
The context facilitates another purpose beyond the
being the basis for “encryption”. Because it is created
exclusively by two communicating nodes, and is
unique to just those two nodes, their conversation, and
specific elements thereof (time, place, etc.), no other
entity can correctly apply it. Therefore, proper
application of the unique context serves as a means of
authentication of the nodes involved.
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4.2. The Process
A process to create and use an exclusive slang
between two nodes in a network would require the
following steps:
1. Given a need to communicate securely a
message between two nodes in a
communication
network,
begin
by
exchanging non-secure, inconsequential
flows between the two nodes (ICMP
commands, for example), keeping a log as the
exchanges continue. The log may include any
and all of the flow(s) exchanged between the
two nodes, including protocol details (packet
headings, time stamps, etc.) as well as
message content.
2. Using the log as a reference, agree on
methods, possibly similar to the natural
evolution of human slang, to effect
substitutions for the individual words (or
other subdivisions of the secure message).
3. Apply
the
agreed-upon
methods,
transforming the original message into a
series of words (or other subdivisions of the
message) which, despite being transmitted in
clear text, appear to constitute nonsense, or
content in which an eavesdropper is not
interested.
4. Upon receipt, reverse the agreed-upon
method to obtain the original message.
Now apply these four steps to the process between
every pair of communicating nodes in a network. As
message content traverses a network, every node-node
pair along the way would repeat the process, each time
creating a new and unique context and using a different
transformation method. While the “encryption”
achieved at this point may appear to be a simple
substitution cypher, it is important to note that no
encryption key has been generated or exchanged.
Further, every node-node pair along the
communication pathway is using a different and
unique “language.” Still, the meaning of the original
message would be understood by each node.
Therefore, the two terminal nodes (the original sender
and the ultimate receiver), going through the chain of
node-node pairs, must create their own unique context
and choose their own transformation methods.

B, C, … Z, and assuming that when node A has a
message for node Z, the message must be
communicated through the intermediate nodes, B, C,
etc., node A must communicate first with node B.
Node B then communicates with node C in order to
pass the message along on its path toward node Z.
Node C then communicates with node D, and so on
until the message arrives at node Z.
With lingual transformation, nodes A and B first
create their own unique language or slang, using the
context of their conversation that is known only to A
and B. We can refer to this language as AB language.
Then, node B similarly establishes another, different
new language with node C: BC language. Node C does
similarly with node D, and so on until all of the nodenode pairs from A to Z have their own unique
language. Finally, when the full chain of uniquelanguage-speaking node-node pairs has been
established, node A communicates with node Z via the
chain and creates yet another unique language,
established between node A and node Z (AZ language)
in the same manner as described for all the node-node
pairs (see figure 4). After all these languages have been
established, nodes A and Z can begin exchanging
secret information. At this point, node A translates its
secret message from human language to AZ language,
then translates the result into AB language and sends it
to node B. Lacking context (AZ context), Node B will
not understand the message, but will translate it to BC
language and send it to node C. Node C similarly will
not understand the AZ-language message, but will
translate it to CD language, and so forth.
Throughout the duration of the conversation
between node A and node Z, every node-node pair
continuously modifies its language by reference to its
continuously-changing common context. Nodes A and
Z also continuously evolve their own unique language
in the same way.

Viewed from another perspective, Lingual
transformation based encryption can be understood in
the following way:
Given a network consisting of several nodes, A,
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Figure 4.

Benefits of Lingual Transformation
Based Encryption

5.

This new method of computer communication
functions as an encryption scheme as well as a
potential one-time pad. This will reduce the risk of the
three vectors of attack mentioned earlier: Man-in-the
middle, brute force, and replay attack. It also
eliminates the danger of stolen keys (because there are
no keys to steal).
A man-in-the-middle attack is only effective if the
attacker can copy the data and extract the cleartext. The
only conversation that the attacker can capture is
between only two nodes in the chain. These two nodes
(pick any communicating pair) are only speaking their
version of slang. The actual conversation between
nodes A and Z appears as nonsense to C and D, for
example, because it is conducted in a language (AZ
language) they don’t know. However, C and D
translate and pass on the “nonsense” words into their
language (CD language) which when “decrypted” still
would be in a language unknown to anyone except A
and Z.

The use of Brute Force would be irrelevant as
there is no password or key to brute force out of the
conversation. Agreeing on a transformation method is
not equivalent to sharing a key, just as agreeing to
speak French is not equivalent to giving a specific
password. Even if one element of the conversation
could be deciphered, the other elements would not be
compromised because each is “encrypted” differently.
A replay attack would be foiled by the fact that all of
the languages employed are continuously evolved,
effectively creating a one-time pad. An attacker would
gain nothing by replaying a recorded conversation as
the conversation is either dropped or evolved beyond
the limit of the replayed recording.
Of course, other threats also exist that are not
solvable by encryption because they involve attacking
static data, human users, or operating systems. Since
social engineering involves attacks on the human user
and not on the data, encryption of any kind is irrelevant
against it. A port scan or vulnerability attack is a server
side attack and not a conversation attack therefore this
proposed encryption method will have little effect on
reducing any threat via port scan. Denial of service
attack also does not have anything to do with
encryption and therefore any method of encryption
will not reduce this attack vector. Any attack on the
physical computer is also not defensible by
communication-based encryption [12].
The scheme described in this paper successfully
would improve the defense against the methods of
attack which target weaknesses in encryption. These
results would help any type of computer
communication be more effective in keeping the
secrets secure.

6. Challenges
Two major challenges immediately become
apparent
with
lingual
transformation-based
encryption. The first is the time necessary to establish
context in order to morph computer language into an
unrecognizable quasi-slang. In addition to the original
establishment of the context, the need for continual
updates will also prove time-consuming. Along with
the context, the actual lexicon of the unique language
also must evolve. Of course, the speed at which
computers operate will greatly compress the time
needed to evolve language compared to humans;
nonetheless there will be a time lag. Bandwidth is a
related concern due to the amount of overhead data
exchange required to establish unique slangs before
secrets can be shared.
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The second challenge lies in the actual methods
for morphing language. In addition to contributing to
the time problem, the potential complexity of creating
a new language on the fly will likely be challenging.
While historically, language evolution takes time,
slang develops more quickly by substituting new
words or changing the meaning of existing words. The
easiest substitutions would probably come directly
from the context, but other substitution might be more
secure. A system might instead use context elements
as “menu choices” for other methods of substitution.
Some possible methods are listed:
• Rhyming words:
• Synonyms
• Antonyms
• Homonyms
• Cockney Rhyming Slang
• Phoneme deconstruction/reconstruction
• Language translation
• Quasi-random replacement
The greater number of methods used, the more robust
lingual transformation based encryption will become.
Slang is apparently a universal human language
concept. [23] We envision a constant and ongoing
quest for new methods. The methods above focus only
on changing the vocabulary and no other characteristic
of language. Other possible areas to search for
manipulation methods might include: spoken language
(including voice pitch, speed, and pronunciation),
purposeful and meaningful misspellings, and grammar
(including sentence structure).

7. Future Uses
As this technology emerges and evolves, ideas about
future uses include, but certainly are not limited by, the
following.
• Morphing data within a single computer.
Using the internal I/O of the computer, this
method could be built into the controllers
themselves to encrypt the data stored on the
hard drive.
• Creating an ad-hoc network in a company’s
DMZ to force an enhanced language
morphed network communication, thus
ensuring that language morphing is
occurring. This technique would help keep
the technology future-proof. By adding nodes
to the system the morphed language gets
more complicated and morphed. Adding

•

•

system after system would force subsequent
attacks to keep up with similar resources.
Keeping records of previously created
morphed languages to use as digital
fingerprints.
Each
node
to
node
communication could be logged and stored.
Once logged computers could identify
themselves based upon that previous, and
unique communication. This could speed up
future communications with same devices.
As quantum computers are created and
brought to market, this method, due to its lack
of math, can still be used to protect secret
messages. Quantum computers create serious
problems for math-based encryption. Lingual
transformation-based encryption uses the
communication as the basis for morphing
rather than an exchanged key or known
algorithm.

8. Summary
In this paper we have put forward the theoretical
proposition that the benefits of human slang use could
be effectively realized in data communication by
applying similar principles. Humans routinely
manipulate standard language to achieve purposes like
authentication and secure communication. Computers
might just as well emulate that behavior. Some
important features of a practical implementation of this
idea are:
• Keyless encryption, eliminating the need for
safe storage and exchange of encryption keys.
• Continuous evolution, essentially creating a
one-time pad.
• Non-math logic, allaying concern about the
threat of quantum key cracking.
Some additional benefits include:
• Greatly increased effort required for attackers
to compromise large numbers of records
(because the language continually morphs, a
successful breach would yield only a small
amount of data).
• Automatic authentication and compromise
detection (because communication is based
only on the exact common context of the two
nodes involved – the very presence of a third
party alters the context, and therefore is
detectable).
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•

A new method that diverges from the “arms
race” (bigger and bigger key sizes) way of
protecting data communication.

Of course, a healthy skepticism is appropriate when an
unproven idea is advanced. Naturally many questions
about proposed benefits remain until a practical
implementation can provide answers. The following
list is representative of some objections that might be
raised:
• This is no better than a simple substitution
cypher.
• A trained and/or experienced linguist could
easily crack the code.
• An eavesdropper at the terminal node would
know everything the terminal node knows.
Addressing such concerns is more than a matter of
debate. These and other concerns will require thorough
proving through rigorous testing (which is underway,
but without reportable results as of this writing).
However, with careful consideration of this list we
observe:
• Ultimately all encryption is substitution.
However, this idea is different from other
methods because
o there is no key exchange; o while
the terminal nodes participate in
lingual transformations with their
immediate neighbors, they remain
unaware
of
the
other
transformations between them;
o the transformations are performed
continually, so the encryption
evolves as the conversation
continues. If an eavesdropper could
decipher the encryption, he would
almost immediately have to do it
again;
o the communication between nodes,
for example in BC language, CD
language, DE language, etc. consists
of translations from AZ language.
An eavesdropper who deciphers one
of the languages would still have to
decipher AZ language (then return
to the 3rd point, above)
• The linguist would have to be quick, and
his/her work continuous. In any case, if the
language were deciphered, the breach would
consist of one communication unit (word,
packet, record), not tens of millions as in
contemporary breaches. Additionally, as the

•

data entering any given node has already been
substituted with a different language, the
original data can only be translated at the
terminal nodes.
The presence of an eavesdropper at a terminal
node indicates a lapse in all types of security.
Any security/encryption method will
eventually be breached if an attacker has
access to the terminal data node.

9. Conclusion
There will always be a need for secret
communication to be kept from prying eyes and ears.
Harking back to Julius Caesar, the need to keep secrets
has always been at the forefront of military,
government, corporate and other private operations.
Because opposing entities will always attempt to
discover important secrets, we always will have a need
to create new and better ways of keeping our
communication safe. Language-morphing techniques
will contribute to the evolution of keeping secrets.
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